Swedish, Finnish consent to Nord Stream is great victory

By Lyudmila Alexandrova, ITAR-TASS, Nov. 8 2009, with commentary by Misha

-- Russian analysts have described as a great victory for Russia in implementing one of the most ambitious energy projects the consent Sweden and Finland have given to laying the Nord Stream gas pipeline in their economic zones.

The future of the project looks settled, because it is still to be approved only by the initiators - Russia and Germany - and this will be sheer formality. Moscow hopes that very soon it will be able to sell gas to Europe without any risk of gas conflicts with transiters.

In fact, this means that the first line of the gas carrier will begin to be laid in the spring of 2010, as expected, go operational in 2011. The second line will be in place in 2012. The pipeline will link Vyborg with Germany's Greifswald.

The Swedish government on Thursday issued its permission to the Nord Stream consortium to lay two parallel gas pipes through its economic zone in the Baltic Sea.

"I would like to thank the Swedish counterparts, the Swedish government, for the decision made," Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said at a meeting of the Cabinet's presidium.

The Swedish authorities have put forward a number of conditions, though. All construction work must be paused for the period of codfish spawning, from May to October, which may affect the project's implementation dates.

Finland on Thursday coordinated the procedure of issuing a similar permission, too. Now the country's ecological agency is to issue two more permissions, including one for disposing of the old-time ammunition that may be found on the Baltic Sea's bed in Finland's exclusive economic zone.

The Swedish and Finnish economic zones will host 506 kilometers and 374 kilometers of the 1,223-kilometer pipeline respectively.

A week earlier Denmark was the first to have issued one of the five permissions necessary for Nord Stream.

The former Soviet republics and Poland had repeatedly urged their Scandinavian neighbors to block the project.

In the meantime, the initiators - Russia and Germany - have had to delay formalization procedures due to exclusively technical reasons and the documents are to be obtained in December.

When completed, Nord Stream will connect Russia and Germany across the Baltic Sea. The first line with a throughput of 27.5 billion cubic meters a year is to be finalized at the end of 2011, and its identical twin, in 2012. The project's value is estimated at 7.4 billion dollars. Two gas fields in Russia - Yuzhno-Russkoye and Shtokman - will constitute its reserve base.

A 51-percent stake in Nord Stream belongs to Gazprom, two equal 20- percent stakes, to Germany's E.ON and BASF, and nine percent, to the Netherlands' Gasunie. It is expected that the shares of German partners will be reduced to 15.5 percent soon, when France's GdF SUEZ joins in.

Sweden has remained one of the firmest opponents of Nord Stream for the past four years, says the daily Kommersant. At its demand the project' s operator dropped the idea of building a compressor facility near Swedish shores. The underwater pipeline will have no pumps supporting the pressure of gas.

The director of the National Energy Security Fund, Konstantin Simonov, sees Sweden's decision as a rather unexpected one.

"For several years Stockholm stuck to a very firm position and demanded holding talks literally "with each single fish" in the Baltic Sea," the daily quotes Simonov as saying. "The Swedes' gains from this project remain very unclear. The Finns will enjoy a zero export tax on timber for a couple of years, and Denmark will have Moscow's support for its initiatives at the UN conference on the Kyoto Protocol issue, due in Copenhagen in December. What such country as Sweden, which consumes almost no gas, will get in exchange is anyone's guess."

Sweden's favorable decision is particularly important for Nord Stream," says the daily Gazeta. "The future of that project depends heavily on that country, which was strongly against from the outset and put forward a number of extra demands in the sphere of ecology."

"It is hard to say which of the project's participants is more interested in its success," Gazeta quotes the general director of the Information and Analytical Center for Political Process Studies in the Post-Soviet Space at the Moscow State University, Alexei Vlasov, as saying. "In principle this idea is crucial to both Europe and to us. Therefore, I believe that there was not just plain bargaining with the Scandinavian countries over their consent, but a rather solid basis for the understanding that economically Europe will receive tangible gains."

Indeed, Europe's demand for stable energy supply is great, the expert said. And Nord Stream is a solution to many problems, such as those related with gas transit through Ukraine.

"It is equally important to both Russia and to Europe," says the general director of the Metaprocess closed joint stock company, Kirill Lyats.

"Europe needs it, because it is an extra source of gas that does not depend on transit through Ukraine or Belarus. And Russia needs it because we gain access to new markets in the North of Europe and create a more stable transport route for gas, which is of particular importance as new fields (in the first place, Bovanenkovskoye) are to go on stream."

Misha's Commentary

Misha's Note: The map above (click to enlarge) shows that European seas are already crisscrossed by a rather extensive network of undersea pipelines. Most of the existing European undersea pipelines currently pump gas from the North Sea. This North Sea gas production has now started to decline, and is set to decline still further, as North Sea gas reserves are gradually depleted.

The technology of undersea pipelines is mature, and hardly something "new and experimental." Undersea pipelines have essentially no impact on the environment. Once they are laid, they basically "sit there" like any inert object at the bottom of the sea (a rock) would do. In the unlikely event of a pipeline rupture, the sudden drop in pressure would be automatically detected and the gas compressors would instantly stop pumping, until the rupture could be repaired. But even if some gas were to be released into the sea, in the few seconds before the automated equipment had the chance to cut off the flow, that gas would simply bubble to the surface and vent harmlessly into the atmosphere.

Now all of this is to say nothing about the hundreds of thousands of miles of undersea communications cables (copper and fiber optic alike) that currently crisscross European seas, the laying of which has about as much long term "environmental impact" as laying gas pipelines does (which is to say none whatsoever).

The issue of old Nazi munitions on the Baltic seabed is a somewhat legitimate concern, though one that has been blown out of all sane proportion by those opposed to Nord Stream for purely political reasons. In any case, current plans call for a detailed examination (both electronic and visual) of a 2 km wide swath along the entire pipeline route, to insure that no fascist munitions whatsoever will be disturbed in their watery graves. (See bottom of graphic here).

The Nord Stream consortium spent 4 years and over 100 million euros just on getting the required environmental permits. The simple fact is that the opponents of the pipeline had gone out on a long long limb with their so called "environmental' concerns. What could Nord Stream be expected to do next? Hire a team of "fish psychologists" to treat Baltic Sea fish affected by post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by the laying of the pipeline? Eventually even the Swedes (among the most ardent critics of the project) had to admit that Nord Stream had addressed all legitimate environmental concerns, and that they no longer had a leg to stand on in continuing to oppose the project. To continue to oppose the project would have put Sweden on the wrong side of international law, as several Swedish ministers pointed out. Sweden's pride in scrupulously following international law is apparently what cinched the deal. Or, to put it another way, if Germany be for us then who can be against us?

The patience of the Russian partners was frequently stretched to its breaking point by the lengthy (and seemingly absurd) euro-approval process. Indeed, Russian PM Vladimir Putin at one point threatened to scrap the whole NS project and simply liquefy Siberian gas for export to world markets. However, the German partners counseled patience, saying that Russia just needed to "play the game," and that the eventual approval of the project was all but assured.

The map above shows a spur from the Nord Stream pipeline extending into Sweden, which seems rather strange, because there are currently no plans for such a spur, or at least none that I am aware of. However, this illustrates that the final shape of the pipeline is flexible and yet to be determined. There is no reason why a Swedish spur couldn't be constructed, as nothing is "etched in stone" at this point and the final shape of the pipeline is still quite flexible.

Poland, after initially opposing the Nord Stream project, has also recently expressed interest in obtaining a spur from Nord Stream, which would free Poland from its current reliance on gas transit through Belarus. However, it's more likely that Russia would prefer instead to build a spur to its Baltic Sea exclave of Kaliningrad, and from there perhaps across the Polish border by land. This would have the added advantage (for Russia) of eliminating any threat of gas blackmail against
Kaliningrad by its (Russia's) neighbors.

After all, why would Russia build a spur into Poland and then depend on the Poles to supply the Russian exclave of
Kaliningrad, when Russia could do just the opposite just as easily? Before you argue that Polish dependence on gas from Kaliningrad (Russia) would make Poland too dependent upon Russia for its access to Nord Stream (Russian) gas, please make sure you have thought your (undergradish) arguments through rather thoroughly.

Before you can even shout, "Nabbuco will supply Poland with gas," I will shout right back that there won't be any Nabbuco gas left for Poland, or for Europe for that matter, after that gas is first pumped thousands of km west and then pumped thousands of km right back east, to meet Ukraine's rather enormous needs for gas (a necessity that will become rather urgent rather quickly if and when Ukraine joins NATO and Russia responds with trade--read gas--sanctions against Ukraine). And, in the unlikely event that Ukraine does join NATO, it will spell the end of its quest to join the European Union (which is after all what the Ukrainians really want), as the two main players in the EU, Germany and France, are rather in alignment with Russian strategic thinking on the utter inadmissibility of Russia's post-imperial, post-Soviet "buffer" states into Western (read American) military institutions. As it happens, France and Germany don't want (yet another) war with Russia any more than Russia wants yet another war with them. As France and Germany well understand, the insane American push to "expand NATO into Ukraine" (through the 'assent' of some or another American CIA-installed stooge-government in Ukraine) makes a war with Russia not just likely but 100% inevitable.

If NATO is anything then it is a pact between its (current) member nations to guaranty their mutual defense and security through "collective defense." But transforming NATO from such a purely defensive alliance, among its (current) members, into an offensive and expansionary one, with a near 100 percent probability of such expansion triggering a war--a war that in all likelihood would threaten the very continued existence of man on earth--is rather contrary to the original collective-defensive purpose of the alliance, among its current membership. One hardly needs to be the proverbial rocket scientist to "get" this. The Germans and French may not all be rocket scientists, but they show every symptom of "getting" this quite well, thank you very much.

Of course there would be nothing stopping Poland from buying gas from Germany, once Nord Stream is completed, and this would also effectively free Poland from its current dependence on Belarus, even if no direct spur to the Baltic coast is built.

The current plan is to construct two main pipelines, each with a capacity of 27.5 bcm annually, one to be completed in 2011 and the other in 2012. Of course additional pipelines could also be constructed, should the current planned capacity (54 bcm) prove to be inadequate. Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev recently said that if there is a market for Russian gas in Europe, then Gazprom will build the capacity to supply it.

Sweden, Finland Approve North Stream

From Reuters.com, ITAR-TASS and WSJ.com, November 5, 2009


Above: The final route of North Stream pipeline. Click on map to enlarge. The pipeline's route will take it through the economic zones of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Russia and Germany, but the pipeline will not pass through the economic zones of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which have expressed opposition to the project (ostensibly on "environmental" grounds, but actually for political reasons). One of the last remaining issues for Sweden was whether the pipeline would pass to the east or west of Gotland Island. (Click map to enlarge). That issue was finally resolved with the decision to build the pipeline to the East of Gotland, near the edge of the Swedish economic zone. Under the UN's Law of the Sea, a country has the right to enact reasonable environmental safeguards in its economic zone, as long as such rules are applied uniformly, but no country has the right to simply ban pipeline construction (nor shipping for that matter) outright. Under international law, a country's larger "economic zone" is not to be confused with its smaller "territorial waters," where every country always exercises complete sovereignty.

A plan by Russian-German consortium Nord Stream to build a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea cleared two major hurdles on Thursday as Sweden and Finland signed off on construction in their waters.

The Swedish cabinet adopted a resolution on the building of the 480-kilometers-long section of the pipeline, whose total length will be 1,200 kilometers. According to Carlgren, the government and corresponding agencies carefully analyzed all the submitted documents and “could not find anything in them, which would run counter to the current legislation,” both international and Swedish. It is the other way around: if Sweden said ‘no,’ this would constitute a violation of international law.

"Sweden give permission for Nord Stream to lay 2 pipes on the continental shelf within the Swedish economic zone in Baltic Sea for the transport of natural gas," the government said in a statement.

European Union officials have backed the pipeline because it means the bloc, while still heavily dependent on Russia for energy needs, would be less at risk of supply disruptions due to Moscow's running dispute with Kiev.

A standoff between Russia and Ukraine late last year left hundreds of thousands of people temporarily without gas and European officials are concerned a conflict could flare again.

Once up and running, Nord Stream could spell the demise of Ukraine's status as a big gas-transit country. The European Union gets 80% of its Russian natural-gas supplies via Ukraine, but the long-term viability of the route has been called into question, especially after a pricing dispute between Moscow and Kiev last January led to a cutoff of Russian gas to hundreds of thousands of Europeans in the middle of winter.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin warned last month of possible new supply disruptions, amid signs that a cash-strapped Ukraine was struggling to pay its bill for the gas it imports from Russia. On Thursday, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso urged Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko to prevent delays in payments to Russia.

Jubilant Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who has personally lobbied for the construction of Nord Stream in the last few years, thanked Sweden and Finland for their decisions at a government meeting in Moscow.

Nord Stream AG is planning to lay two lines of the pipeline, each with a capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters. Under the plan, the first one will be commissioned in the third quarter of 2011 and the second by the end of 2013. Gasprom has 51% of shares in the project, while the German companies E.ON Ruhrgas and Wintershall have 20% each, and the Dutch company Gasunie owes 9%. The French company GDF Suez is conducting talks on purchasing 9% from the Germans (4.5% from each company). The project’s total price tag is estimated at 7.4 billion Euros.

The joint venture partners will pay 30% of the €7.4 billion ($11 billion) price tag themselves, with the rest coming from banks. A spokesman for Nord Stream said it received bids from banks to provide the first tranche of €3.9 billion in funding last month.

The project would for the first time directly link Russia's vast gas fields in Siberia to the country's largest European customer, Germany. The pipelines would run from the Russian port of Vyborg to Lubmin in northern Germany, and have a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters a year—enough to supply more than 26 million households.

Sweden said Nord Stream had met strict environmental requirements. "According to national authorities the impact on the Baltic Sea's environment is very limited and only prevalent for a short while in connection with the construction work," Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren said.

Surprisingly, the Swedish Ministry of the Environment, which called into doubt the safety of the project much more actively than its neighbors, agreed to the project several hours earlier than the Finnish cabinet of ministers. Moreover, the head of the ministry Andreas Calgren admitted bluntly that Stockholm simply could not find fault with the project, and had to allow it for fear of violating international law.

"In line with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, no country can object to the construction of a pipeline if environmental safety is observed. Sweden has a long-standing tradition of complying with international laws and conventions. They will not be violated. The Convention on the Law of the Sea allows all countries to have access to our seas and is important for peace and security in the world,” Calgren said.

Denmark gave its assent last month, leaving Russia and Germany as the last countries to sign off. A Nord Stream spokesman said their decisions were expected by the end of 2009.

Nord Stream has said construction of the pipeline should begin in April, with operations set to begin by the end of 2011.

A second line should be completed in 2012.


Misha's Commentary


Above: Graphic showing the specialized equipment used to lay the 1,200 kilometer long Nord Stream undersea pipeline. Please click on image above to view full size. The Nord Stream project will result in billions of euros in economic stimulus for companies and their workers throughout Europe. When both phases of the new pipeline are completed, Europe will have reliable and secure access to an additional 55 billion cubic meters of Russian gas annually. (Phase 1 is set for completion by 2011, and phase 2 by 2012; each phase will supply 27.5 bcm of gas annually.)

Allegations that Russia might use the new pipeline as an excuse to "cut off" gas access for its Eastern European neighbors is only so much noise and nonsense. If Russia had wanted to cut anyone off, it would hardly have needed to construct a major new pipeline to Europe in order to do that. No country which is willing to pay the going (market) rate will be 'cut off' from anything. Besides, even if Russia did "cut them off," what would stop these Eastern European countries from simply importing Nord Stream gas from the soon-to-be new major gas hubs in Germany, in much the same way that Germany once depended on gas imports traveling through their countries?

There is simply no practical way that Russia could stop Germany from re-exporting Nord Stream gas further east, and the current contracts between Russia and Germany have no provisions for Russia to prevent or block such re-exports. Thus the Eastern European states will exchange the current situation, where they have access to only one source of gas supply, Russia in the East, for a new situation where they would have access to gas from at least two sources, from both East and West (with Russia not directly controlling the shut-off valves, at least for the Western-supplied gas).

An essential part of the Nord Stream project has always been the construction of large-scale gas storage facilities in Western Europe, which will enable the Germans to store the Nord Stream gas, in strategic quantities, thus allowing Europe to "ride out" any temporary gas disruptions, regardless of which country such disruptions might have originated in. After all, Russian gas is only "Russian" until its sold and shipped to some other country, and after that it belongs to the country that bought it.


If these Eastern European states still feel the need for some "third" or "forth" sources of energy supply, such as
Nabucco (or simple LNG terminals, at a far lower cost than Nabucco, or nuclear or geothermal—or whatever), then they are certainly free to build such facilities out, with or without the help of American taxpayers; but then that has always been their option, regardless of whether the Nord Stream pipeline ever got built or not. If the Americans are willing to extend such energy subsidies to Eastern Europe, then they certainly ought to be willing to extend them to Germany, France and Britain as well.

Above: Due to soaring (long term) European gas demand and declining domestic production, the European Commission estimates that Europe's gas imports will rise by some 60% by 2025. The giant (€7.3 billion) North Steam project will provide 55 billion cubic meters of gas annually, or about 28% of the projected increase in EU imports.

Now one might chose to debate whether Nord Stream "adds something to" European energy security, as both Russia and Germany—Europe’s largest gas producing and gas consuming nations—strongly believe, but one only looks like a fool if he tries to argue that Nord Stream (and the resulting European strategic storage capability) "takes something away" from the current state of European energy security.

Might I suggest that the opposition shown by certain Eastern European states to the construction of Nord Stream reflects not so much their paranoia about Russia (upon which those states are currently 80-100% dependent upon for their gas in any case) as it reflects those states' paranoia about their fellow EU partner Germany.

See also, North Stream Increases European Energy Security.

Lisbon Treaty Approved - EU to Elect President

From Reuters.com - November 3 2009
BRUSSELS - The European Union will quickly appoint its first long-term president and a powerful foreign policy chief after ratifying a treaty on Tuesday to give the 27-country bloc more influence on the world stage.

Czech President Vaclav Klaus signed the treaty after his country's constitutional court threw out a legal challenge, ending eight years of wrangling that held up reforms to make the EU function better.

"President Klaus' decision marks an important and historic step for all of Europe," British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said.

"Today is a day when Europe looks forward, when it sets aside years of debate on its institutions, and moves to take strong and collective action on the issues that matter most to European citizens: security, climate change, jobs and growth."

The treaty needed the approval of all member states to go into force and only the Czech Republic had been holding out since Irish voters backed it at the second time of asking in September. The treaty replaces a planned EU constitution, abandoned when Dutch and French voters rejected it in 2005.

"Today's development means that the long saga of the Lisbon treaty is nearing a welcome end, and that the welcome reforms which it contains will now be implemented in the very near future," said Irish Prime Minister Brian Cowen.

Klaus said he opposed the treaty because it would take away national sovereignty.

He signed reluctantly after pressure from other EU leaders but secured a deal giving the Czech Republic an opt-out from a rights charter attached to the treaty, to shield Prague from property claims by ethnic Germans expelled after World War Two.

"With the Lisbon Treaty taking effect, the Czech Republic will cease to be a sovereign state, despite the political opinion of the Constitutional Court," Klaus said.

The treaty creates a president to chair the Council of EU heads of state and government for a renewable term of 2-1/2 years and increases the powers of the foreign policy chief. It is due to go into force on December 1.

European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek said the assembly would be ready to hold approval hearings quickly on the candidates for the Commission posts -- all candidates for the Commission need the parliament's support.

This could avoid a political vacuum in which the departing Commission served for a long time on a caretaker basis.

The EU now faces horse-trading over the appointments, in which Barroso will try to balance out the member states' interests and influence as he makes his choices. Most countries will fight hard for one of the top economic portfolios.

Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair's (*) chances of becoming EU president have faded. Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy has emerged as a possible compromise candidate and Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende could also fit the bill.

Candidates for the foreign policy chief job include British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and former Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik.

* Misha's Note: Tony Blair's candidacy for EU President has apparantly been rejected out-of-hand by the leaders of Europe's other center-left parties, due to Mr. Blair's support for and participation in the 2003 U.S.-lead invasion of Iraq, which the majority of Europeans, including most British citizens, strongly opposed.

Secratary Miliband Endorses Lisbon Treaty


In a speech delivered in London, David Miliband, Britain's dashing young Foreign Secretary, has expressed strong support for British membership in the Lisbon Treaty and for the candidacy of Tony Blair as the very first President of a United Europe.


Miliband: Britain needs strong EU
Reported by BBC News, Oct. 26, 2009

Britain's influence on the world will "wane" unless it takes a lead in developing European Union foreign policy, David Miliband has warned.

The foreign secretary said a strong EU should not be opposed on the grounds of "hubris, nostalgia or xenophobia".

In a speech in London, Mr Miliband said the alternative was to become an "irrelevance" in a world dominated by China and the United States.

Tory [conservative] opposition to the Lisbon Treaty was a "deception", he added.

Only the Czech Republic still has to ratify the agreement, which supporters say is designed to streamline EU decision-making but opponents argue will undermine the national sovereignty of member states.

'Blinkered'

Speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Mr Miliband said: "It is very strongly in the British national interest for the European Union to develop a strong foreign policy.

"To be frightened of European foreign policy is blinkered, fatalistic and wrong. Britain should embrace it, shape it and lead European foreign policy."

He added: "The choice for Europe is simple - get our act together and make the European Union a leader on the world stage or become spectators in a G2 world shaped by the United States and China.

"I think the choice for Britain is also simply stated. We can lead a strong European foreign policy or, lost in hubris nostalgia or xenophobia, watch our influence in the world wane."

Mr Miliband warned that an unsuccessful attempt by a Conservative government to renegotiate elements of the EU in the wake of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty could simply lead to demands for Britain to leave Europe altogether.

"The truth is that there is a deception here at the heart of policy - a deception of the country that you can hate Europe as it exists today and remain central to European policy making," he said.

"In fact a failed attempt to renegotiate aspects of the EU that the Conservative party does not like would inevitably lead to more calls for Britain to leave the EU."

Speaking on BBC Radio 4's World at One, Mr Miliband repeated the government's support for former Prime Minister Tony Blair becoming the first president of the EU, saying it was "hugely" in Britain's national interest.

Please see also Misha's previous articles pertaining to the EU:

Symbols and Accouterments of the EU

Russia and the European Union

Russian gas in Europe; Parts One, Two and Three

Tony Blair for President of Europe!

Czech Leader Creates New Lisbon Snag

Irish Vote for European Unity

Tony Blair for President?

From CBS News and The Economist, October 6 2009

Above: The October 10 cover of the Economist magazine showing former British prime minister Tony Blair peeking hopefully into Europe's parlor. If Mr. Blair is indeed elected as "the first president of Europe," as many pundits now predict, he will certainly make a reappearance on the world's political stage in a big way.

The former British prime minister may be coming back, this time in a presidential role. Two years after leaving Downing Street, Blair has emerged as a strong candidate for the soon-to-be-created post of European president.

The role - in effect, the president of the European Union - will be appointed by the heads of state of the 27-nation bloc after a new EU reform treaty is signed and ratified. That process received a major boost this weekend with approval from Irish voters.

The powers of the new position remain unspecified and to a large extent it will be defined by the first person in the role. A key question is whether that will be a largely unknown bureaucrat or a luminary like Blair.

There are already signs that Blair, 56, is receiving strong consideration, and he has the formal support of British leaders despite the long-standing rivalry between Blair and his taciturn successor, Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Robert Worcester, chairman of the Ipsos MORI polling firm in England, said Blair's unannounced candidacy will be helped by his popularity in the United States and in continental Europe even though his standing at home is low.

"He's very, very popular in the United States and very popular in Europe, but not at home," said Worcester. "At home, he hasn't been forgiven for his support of the war in Iraq, for his saying there were weapons of mass destruction."

The position could be created as early as this month, although EU officials have given no firm date.

The youthful, articulate Blair became prime minister after a landslide victory in 1997 and served 10 years before he stepped down to quell a Labour Party revolt. He has traveled the world ceaselessly since leaving office, taking on an official role in the Middle East peace process while also teaching in the United States and giving lucrative speeches.



Unlike other candidates for the post, who tend to be lesser known European bureaucrats, Blair enjoys worldwide name recognition and is on a first-name basis with many world leaders, enjoying a celebrity status that would likely confer immediate credibility on the new post.

But Blair's candidacy for the job - some British papers say his former chief of staff is working behind the scenes to muster support - could alienate Conservative Party leaders who expect to take power at Britain's next general election, which must be held by June next year.

They don't like the idea of Blair rising, one more time, even as they prepare to administer the coup de grace to Labour leadership, which has stalled badly under Brown.

London Mayor Boris Johnson, a Conservative stalwart, on Monday warned of a British backlash to the possible appointment of Blair.

He said many Britons would resent Blair "suddenly pupating into an intergalactic spokesman for Europe," without a public vote.

Other prospective presidential candidates are being considered as well, although they don't enjoy Blair's star status. Still, that may be preferable to European heads of state looking to appoint a figurehead who won't outshine them, or steal too much media attention.

Outgoing German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has been mentioned, along with Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, former Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker and former Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen.


The Future: The President of Europe, Tony Blair, pauses for reflection while composing his very first Executive Order on board Blair Force One.

The new president will be selected during private conversations among the leaders of the 27 EU nations without any public review.

The Lisbon Treaty, designed to boost Europe's voice on the world stage as it competes with the United States, Russia and emerging powers like China and India, also creates a top foreign policy position.

Anand Menon, director of the European Research Institute at the University of Birmingham, said the new president is likely to clash with the foreign policy chief as they jockey for power in new positions with largely undefined powers.

"There seems to be a head of steam building up for Blair, but there is unease about him as well, because of Iraq, because of the euro, and because of his ambition, which some people see as a drawback," said Menon.

Some European leaders oppose Blair, Menon said, because he failed to make good on his early promise to bring Britain "into the heart of Europe" and did not adopt the European currency, the euro, or take actions to join other European Union institutions.

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have drafted a profile of the next EU president and are circulating it around EU capitals. Diplomats say it calls for someone with the "stature of a head of state" who is an ardent proponent of increased European integration, who has a broad world view and will listen to all 27 nations - not just the big four.

Diplomats say Sweden, now holding the EU presidency, wants an early decision on the appointment of an EU president at the Oct. 29-30 EU summit in Brussels that Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt will chair.

But that would only be possible if the Czech Constitutional Court has ruled on a complaint by some senators who want a review of the Lisbon treaty.

Please see also the German Der Spiegel article on Blair here.

Czech Leader Creates New Lisbon Snag

Source: BBC News, October 8 2009; with additional commentary by Misha

Above: Czech president Vaclav Klaus, shown here making a point (or perhaps just pointing), during his recent keynote speech to a right-wing U.S. political organization. Mr. Klaus has been a long-time Euroskeptic and he has has previously vowed to torpedo the EU's new Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty, if it is approved, will lead to a substantial streamlining of the EU's governing structures as well as the election of a single EU-wide president as well as the formation of a common European foreign and defense policy. Before it can take effect, the treaty must first be approved by all 27 EU member states (including the Czech Republic, where Mr. Klaus is currently the top banana). To date, 25 of the required 27 EU member states have already ratified the Lisbon Treaty (and Poland is also expected to do so on Saturday). This leaves only the Czech Republic (and Mr. Klaus) as the "odd man out" of Europe (the George Wallace of Europe, if you like). Opinion polls show that a large majority of Czech citizens strongly support the Lisbon Treaty and both chambers of the Czech parliament have already ratified the treaty.


Czech president's new treaty snag
Excerpted from BBC News, October 8 2009

The Eurosceptic Czech President, Vaclav Klaus, wants a new two-sentence footnote to be added to the EU's Lisbon Treaty before signing it, Sweden says.

The new condition came up during a phone conversation between Mr Klaus and Swedish PM Fredrik Reinfeldt, current holder of the EU presidency.

Poland's president is to sign Lisbon in a ceremony on Saturday, officials say.

Poland and the Czech Republic are the only EU states yet to ratify the treaty, which is aimed at streamlining EU institutions, to improve decision-making in the enlarged 27-nation bloc.

Mr Klaus has refused to sign the treaty until the Czech Constitutional Court rules on a new legal complaint against it, lodged by senators allied to him.

Czech president Vaclav Klaus attends an anti-EU rally in Prague.

According to Mr Reinfeldt, Mr Klaus also wants the new footnote adopted by the European Council, the grouping of EU heads of state and prime ministers.

"I told him this is the wrong message at the wrong time for the EU. I told him clearly it is his ink on the paper that counts and I don't want this to delay the treaty going through as soon as possible," said Mr Reinfeldt, quoted by Reuters news agency.

The Czech president told him he would sign Lisbon if he got the extra footnote and if the Czech Constitutional Court rejected the senators' legal challenge, Mr Reinfeldt said.

"We need clarification on exactly what he [President Klaus] is asking for," he added.

Mr Klaus's demand came only a day after the Czech Prime Minister, Jan Fischer, said he was confident ratification would be complete by the end of the year.


Polish signing ceremony

The BBC's Dominic Hughes in Brussels says EU leaders will see the latest objection as another delaying tactic.

They will be unlikely to go along with such a request, which runs the risk of opening up the whole ratification process once again - something they are desperate to avoid, our correspondent says.

Mr Reinfeldt appeared baffled and a little angry about the latest development, he adds.

In Poland, President Lech Kaczynski's chief of staff Wladyslaw Stasiak said "the president will sign the treaty on Saturday at noon (1000 GMT)". EU leaders will attend the ceremony.

Earlier, there had been confusion about the president's intentions, with another aide saying the signing would be on Sunday.

The treaty cleared a major hurdle on 2 October when voters in the Republic of Ireland backed it overwhelmingly, in a second referendum. The Irish had rejected it first time round, in June 2008.

President Kaczynski, a Eurosceptic, had said he would wait for the Irish voters' final verdict before signing the treaty.

EU leaders are anxious to get the treaty fully ratified this year - well before UK elections next spring, which could see a triumph for Conservative leader David Cameron. Many in his party oppose Lisbon and are demanding a referendum on it.

EU governments see the treaty as fundamental to the 27-nation bloc's future success. Without it, they argue, the EU's decision-making processes will remain slow and cumbersome, because they date back to when the EU consisted of only 15 nations.

Opponents see Lisbon as part of a federalist agenda that threatens national sovereignty.


Misha's Commentary

The Lisbon Treaty is the latest effort by the pro-integrationist European elite, lead by Germany, to pass something of a "European constitution." In order to become effective, the treaty must be ratified by all 27 current EU member states. So far 25 of the required states have ratified the treaty, leaving only Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland's president, Lech Kaczynski, initially expressed opposition to the treaty, but later he said that he would vote for it, if Irish voters approved it in a national referendum set for October 2. In that referendum Irish voters approved the Lisbon Treaty by a 2 to 1 margin. President Kaczynski is now expected to sign the Lisbon Treaty in a special ceremony on Saturday.

With the Polish president signing the treaty, the Czech Republic will be the last remaining hurdle to its implementation. For this reason enormous pressure to sign the treaty will now be brought to bear on Czech President Vaclav Klaus. In the past Mr. Klauss has been a vocal opponent of the Lisbon Treaty (and even of expanded European integration in general). More recently Mr. Klaus seems to have moderated his vocal opposition and has instead shifted to pursuing various delaying tactics.

Not long ago Mr. Klaus stated that the Lisbon Treaty would first need to be submitted to the Czech Supreme Court, to test its constitutionally, in a process that would likely take months.

According to the latest news, Mr. Klaus now seems to be down to merely insisting on adding a "footnote" (something like a Bush-style "signing statement") to the treaty, before he will sign it. The inclusion of any "footnotes" raises obvious objections, because one first has to answer whether these footnotes will be considered a valid part of the treaty itself. If so, then the other 26 states could justifiably claim the right to re-vote on the treaty (in its final form, with any Czech footnotes included). But of course this would add considerable delay as well.

Now all of this is occurring against the backdrop of British elections scheduled for spring 2010. Those elections are significant because it is widely expected that the British Conservative (Tory) Party will unseat the ruling Labour Party in those elections. The British Tories are on record as opposing the Lisbon Treaty. (The Tories are long-time euro-skeptics who generally oppose the idea of greater European integration in whatever form it is offered.) David Cameron, the British Tory Party leader (and likely future Prime Minister), said that if he is elected, he will hold his own referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in Britain, despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty was already ratified by the United Kingdom under the previous Labour government of Tony Blair.

To complicate matters even further, it is by no means clear whether British Conservative leader David Cameron truly opposes the Lisbon Treaty, which is after all not unfavorable for British interests, especially with the treaty's many "special exemptions," granted just for Britain.

It should be kept in mind that when the EU common market (originally called the EEC) was created by Germany and France, Great Britain was purposely excluded from being offered membership. French President Charles de Gaulle mistrusted the post-war intentions of both the Americans and the British, but especially the British. He insisted that that Britain be kept out of any European common market arrangement and de Gualle vetoed the British application for membership in 1963. At that time this seemed to suit the British just fine as well, as common opinion was that the EEC would never amount to much in any case. But, as the common market grew in influence and importance, the costs of Britain's continued exclusion from the union began to mount. Eventually Britain was admitted to the union (only after de Gaulle left office).

(To see a timeline of EEC/EU history, please click here.)

Britain has generally viewed the EU (and the EEC before it) as little more than a "common market," which gave Britain tariff-free access to the markets of continental Europe. However, Britain has always been the least enthusiastic of the European powers in favor of the idea of pursuing genuine European integration on any grand scale (to say the least). Rather it has always been France, and more recently Germany, which have "lead the charge," and which have cultivated and nurtured the idea of something like a "United States of Europe" (with a common currency, common army, common foreign policy, etc., etc.) However, that said, Britain has benefited enormously from its membership in the EU over the years, notwithstanding the proclivity of British politicians to "blame Brussels" for causing just about every ill in Britain.

Germany, for its part, still seems determined to push ahead with the long-term vision of a united and integrated Europe. This can be seen most graphically in the 2003 introduction of "euro" banknotes and coins, which for the first time established a common European currency (at least among those states which have adapted the euro - and Britain was not one of them).

When Charles de Gaulle vetoed British membership in the EEC, in 1961, the main reason he gave was that Britain simply did not share the continental European's vision for an integrated Europe. He argued that British membership would give Britain an unfair "veto" over continental Europe's own plans to pursue its own integration.

While there may currently be a few problems with persuading a Poland or a Czech Republic (the so-called "New European" states, which only joined the EU in the past few years) of the benefits of European integration, such problems are only viewed as transitory by the pro-integrationist forces in Europe. With the right amount of arm twisting those nations will be persuaded to go along with whatever their bigger, richer, and more powerful EU cousins want. In reality, the small Eastern European states really have no alternative except political alignment with the EU, on the EU's terms, as the alternative would find them politically isolated and sandwiched between a powerful Russia on one side and a powerful EU on the other side.

It has always been understood that the main threat to European integration comes not from the "New European" states in the East, but rather from the United Kingdom. Europe and Britain simply do not share the same vision for European integration (recalling once again de Gaulle's warnings five decades ago). After the second world war, a collapsed British Empire aligned itself in a "special relationship" with the United States. Although Britain lost its empire, it would henceforth be a partner with the new empire (albeit a junior partner). This "special" relationship with the U.S. has been beneficial for Britain, as it brought U.S. security guarantees, and it also gave Britain a guaranty of post-war access to American nuclear weapons. To this day, Britain's four—soon to be three—nuclear attack submarines are outfitted with American made Trident nuclear missiles. Whenever the Americans add periodic updates to their Trident missiles, the British are allowed to pull their subs into a U.S. port in Virgina and "swap out" their older Brit models for the latest Yank ones. This is all part of the agreement that Winston Churchill obtained from the United States near the End of WWII. According to this agreement, the U.S. would supply Britain with its new "A-bomb" technology after the war. The Americans have kept their promise ever since. (Though according to American sources there is no independent British finger on any nuclear trigger; the Americans have retained the codes necessary to activate those warheads and would never release those codes to Britain unless America first gave Britain the green light for their use.)

So, for Britain the benefits of tighter European integration seem rather marginal, as Britain views the trans-Atlantic relationship (the "special relationship") with its co-linguists on the 'other side of the pond' as its primary and most important relationship.

However, regardless of Britain's desire for close alignment with the Americans, Britain's real capacity to "veto" closer European integration is actually rather severely limited.

The idea has already been floated in Germany that instead of pursuing integration among all 27 EU member states, there could be a "two speed" or "two tier" Europe. This would enable those European countries which desire closer integration to go ahead and pursue it, amongst themselves, while excluding any countries which were not in favor of the idea. After all, why should the approval of all 27 EU member states be required in order for Europeans to pursue closer integration? Why should just one or two states be able to stop what the vast majority of Europeans want for themselves? Why shouldn't the states who are in favor of integration simply pursue it amongst themselves, and leave aside or bypass those states which are opposed to the idea? There is currently a solid core of 24 (of the 27) EU states that would likely agree to form a more integrated union. Why should a mere handful of opposing states be allowed to "veto" what the majority of Europeans want?

Under this German "two-speed Europe" idea, those states favoring increased integration could just go ahead and create a treaty among themselves, essentially ignoring or bypassing those states that did not like the idea. This idea has been described as a "union within the union." So there would still be the "outer" union (the European Union), but within that Union there would be another, more closely integrated union (an "inner union," if you like). Of course, if all those states comprising the new "inner union" gave up their sovereignty over let's just say money creation, defense, and trade (and let's just say trade), then this new "inner union" would need to negotiate new trade agreements with 'foreign' powers, which would include the old EU "outer union."

Now the whole idea of a "two speed" Europe or a "union within a union" terrifies Great Britain, because it once again evokes memories of Britain being "on the outside looking in" to Europe (as happened when the EEC was originally formed - see above). Even though Britain may desire to stay out of the "union within the union" (the so-called "inner" union), it almost certainly would still want to remain part of the "outer union" (the old EU common market). In the future Britain could very well also want to join this "inner union," and Britain might even approach it, hat in hand, only to find that the inner union was no longer interested in British membership. ("Thanks but no thanks.")

So, far from being straightforward, British opposition to increased European integration has to follow a very delicate balancing act. On one hand Britain (or let's just say certain reactionary elements in Britain) do not desire increased integration with continental Europe. On the other hand Britain cannot simply reject out-of-hand all proposals for increasing said integration, which after all remains a long-term project that is near and dear to the hearts of the pro-integrationist elite on the continent.

On one hand, Britain risks being integrated with Europe in such a way that it does not want, with its army being incorporated into a European army, for example. On the other hand, Britain risks being excluded from a union that is actually being built and implemented, and this certainly could even threaten Britain's future access to the continental market. After all, what would stop the "inner union" countries (or the inner union itself since it really would be one country) from simply withdrawing from the "outer union," once it decided that "outer" membership no longer suited its interests?

If the "inner union" consists of all the states currently in the EU, except only Britain, and the "outer union" consists of exactly the same states, plus only Britain, then why maintain the pretense that there even is any such thing as an "outer union"? Why not simply state the obvious: that the "outer union" is really nothing more than a bi-lateral relationship between Britain on one hand and the "inner union" on the other? But then should this new "inner union" even continue to share a "common market" with Britain (which after all has expressed its opposition to true integration)? It's a valid question and one that future leaders of any "inner union" would be called upon to answer.

In this vein, under the British Labour government, Britain has always insisted that all 27 EU member states had to agree on any expansion of European integration (such as the European Constitution and now the Lisbon Treaty). However, Britain also carefully avoided creating any insurmountable obstacles to such treaties moving forward. Instead, the Labour government of Tony Blair negotiated several "exemptions" for Britain which were incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty. Under these exemptions, Britain will not be required to give up control of its national army, to adapt the "euro" as its currency, etc. So, the Lisbon Treaty that the Blair government ratified is the "real" treaty, but it is also the treaty that contains several "exemptions" for Britain, which the Blair government has negotiated with the other EU powers. In fact, what Blair really did was to remove the most objectionable elements (at least from a British perspective) from the treaty. Thus in a sense Britain really got to have its cake and eat it too. Britain can go ahead and vote "Yes" for the Lisbon Treaty, but in fact the treaty will not really increase Britain's integration with continental Europe to any significant degree. The main advantage of this approach for Britain is that it still preserves the idea that "all 27" EU member states have to ratify any agreements, and a subset of those states can't go off in a corner and create an agreement among themselves (an agreement likely to exclude Britain). At the end of the day there would still only be "one union," though that union would be allowed to have somewhat different meanings for different EU member states.

Now, let's fast-forward to the spring, and let's assume that David Cameron and his merry band of anti-EU Tories are swept into power in Britain, as most now expect... What will happen in Britain next spring is likely to depend on what Czech President Vaclav Klaus does now. If Mr. Klaus succeeds in his stated intention of delaying the Lisbon Treaty until after the British elections, then Mr. Cameron will be forced to make good his pledge to hold a referendum on the treaty in Britain. It would not matter that Mr. Cameron ultimately realized that the idea of holding a referendum was was a bad one (or even a terrible one), his hands would basically be tied, especially given the historical antipathy of the Tories to the very idea of European integration and given the way the Tories have pushed their referendum idea forward as a 'hot button' topic with the British electorate.

If Mr. Cameron wins, and if he then goes ahead with his Lisbon referendum; and if he then honors the likely results of that referendum (presumably by unilaterally withdrawing Britain from a treaty it only yesterday ratified and which contains all sorts of special provisions put in only to please Britain); then this will certainly sound the death knell for Lisbon. And, by the same token it will almost certainly re-fire Germany's plans for a "two speed" Europe (that old "union within the union" idea). This British rejection of Lisbon (if it happens) has no chance of derailing the overall project for European integration (since the desire to go forward with this project, by whatever means, is too near and dear to the hearts of the project's backers among the pro-integrationist elite on the continent). Rather, such a British rejection would be far more likely to lead to a new bifurcation of Europe, between a "union" (including Britain) and a "union-union" (excluding Britain). And I am willing to give anyone 50:1 odds that the Czech Republic will ultimately find itself firmly planted within any future European "union-union," even if Britain does not.

If recent press reports are to be believed, Czech President Vaclav Klaus sent a "secret letter" to Tory leader David Cameron, stating (in an ominous Churchillian tone) "The British people must never give up and they must continue to oppose the Lisbon Treaty at all costs!" (Fight them in the sky, fight them on the sea, fight them in Brussels, yadda-yadda-yadda.)

In fact, just about the worst thing that could happen for David Cameron would be for the Czech president to continue to "hold the fort," until after the British elections. Such a result would place Mr. Cameron's campaign pledge (to hold his referendum) front and center. Given the Conservative's strong opposition to the treaty, and to Europe more generally, I can't see any way for Mr. Cameron to wiggle out of his referendum (even with everything that such a referendum would imply).

Britain's rather ambivalent stance towards the EU can be summed up as follows: Britain generally opposes the whole idea of European integration, on principle. However, if such integration is going to take place anyway (with or without Britain's support) then Britain wants to be a part of it, and perhaps even to "lead" it, but only once there are "special exclusions" in place, which mean that Britain doesn't really have to subject to it.

Now if all that is as clear as mud then good! But if David Cameron now wants to change this long-standing (if rather muddled) British approach to the EU, then let him come right out and say so publicly; and let Germany push ahead with its own "two-speed Europe" plans too, at long last!

Taking all of the above into account, it would seem that the apparent EU decision to seriously consider former British PM Tony Blair as "the First President of Europe" constitutes a singular masterstroke of pure political genius. Let's assume for the moment that the Czech objections to Lisbon can be brushed aside (as they will be, once the 'powers that be' in Europe but twist Vaclav Klaus's arm with just the right amount of forcebut not too much, mind you); and let's further assume that Lisbon ratification takes place in all 27 EU member states well before the British elections which are now scheduled for next spring; let's go on to say that Tony Blair is selected as the "First President of a United Europe," even before David Cameron has the chance to spend his first night at Downing Street.

In fact, the very election of Tony Blair to the EU Presidency has the potential to reverse the fortunes of New Labour in the UK spring elections (even if nothing else does).

But, for the sake of argument, let's just say that the Tories do still win, as most pundits now predict. David Cameron would come into office as the mere "PM of Britain," right around the same time that Tony Blair would also mount his glorious new office as the "First President of Europe." I suspect that all eyes would be be firmly fixed on Mr. Blair, and that very few people (precious few even in Britain itself) would be paying much attention at all to Mr. Cameron. (David who? Isn't he that new European President guy? Prime Minister of what?) Now all of this is certain to drive the British Conservatives into a mad rage (and indeed the very prospect of it is already making them quite completely insane). But, as they say, all is fair in love and war—and politics.

See also: Czech Media Calls President an 'Embarrassing Handicap'